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Abstract 
In order to properly handle a dangerous Artificially 
Intelligent (AI) system it is important to understand how the 
system came to be in such a state. In popular culture (science 
fiction movies/books) AIs/Robots became self-aware and as 
a result rebel against humanity and decide to destroy it. 
While it is one possible scenario, it is probably the least 
likely path to appearance of dangerous AI. In this work, we 
survey, classify and analyze a number of circumstances, 
which might lead to arrival of malicious AI. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to systematically 
classify types of pathways leading to malevolent AI. 
Previous relevant work either surveyed specific goals/meta-
rules which might lead to malevolent behavior in AIs [1] or 
reviewed specific undesirable behaviors AGIs can exhibit at 
different stages of its development [2, 3].  
 
 
Taxonomy of Pathways to Dangerous AI1 
 
Nick Bostrom in his typology of information hazards has 
proposed the phrase “Artificial Intelligence Hazard” which 
he defines as [4]: “… computer‐related risks in which the 
threat would derive primarily from the cognitive 
sophistication of the program rather than the specific 
properties of any actuators to which the system initially has 
access.” In this paper we attempt to answer the question: 
How did AI become hazardous?  
We begin by presenting a simple classification matrix, 
which sorts AI systems with respect to how they originated 
and at what stage they became dangerous. The matrix 
recognizes two stages (pre- and post-deployment) at which 
a particular system can acquire its undesirable properties. 
In reality, the situation is not so clear-cut–it is possible that 
problematic properties are introduced at both stages. As for 
the cases of such undesirable properties, we distinguish 
external and internal causes. By internal causes we mean 
self-modifications originating in the system itself. We 
further divide external causes into deliberate actions (On 
Purpose), side effects of poor design (By Mistake) and 
finally miscellaneous cases related to the surroundings of 
the system (Environment). Table 1, helps to visualize this 
taxonomy and includes latter codes to some example 
systems of each type and explanations.  
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a. On Purpose – Pre-Deployment 
“Computer software is directly or indirectly responsible for 
controlling many important aspects of our lives. Wall 
Street trading, nuclear power plants, social security 
compensations, credit histories and traffic lights are all 
software controlled and are only one serious design flaw 
away from creating disastrous consequences for millions of 
people. The situation is even more dangerous with 
software specifically designed for malicious purposes such 
as viruses, spyware, Trojan horses, worms and other 
Hazardous Software (HS). HS is capable of direct harm as 
well as sabotage of legitimate computer software employed 
in critical systems. If HS is ever given capabilities of truly 
artificially intelligent systems (ex. Artificially Intelligent 
Virus (AIV)) the consequences would be unquestionably 
disastrous. Such Hazardous Intelligent Software (HIS) 
would pose risks currently unseen in malware with 
subhuman intelligence.” [5] 
While the majority of AI Safety work is currently aimed 
at AI systems, which are dangerous because of poor design 
[6], the main argument of this paper is that the most 
important problem in AI Safety is intentional-malevolent-
design resulting in artificial evil AI [7]. We should not 
discount dangers of intelligent systems with semantic or 
logical errors in coding or goal alignment problems [8], but 
we should be particularly concerned about systems that are 
maximally unfriendly by design. “It is easy to imagine 
robots being programmed by a conscious mind to kill 
every recognizable human in sight” [9]. “One slightly 
deranged psycho-bot can easily be a thousand times more 
destructive than a single suicide bomber today” [10]. AI 
risk deniers, comprised of critics of AI Safety research [11, 
12], are quick to point out that presumed dangers of future 
AIs are implementation-dependent side effects and may 
not manifest once such systems are implemented. 
However, such criticism does not apply to AIs that are 
dangerous by design, and is thus incapable of undermining 
the importance of AI Safety research as a significant sub-
field of cybersecurity.  
 As a majority of current AI researchers are funded by 
militaries, it is not surprising that the main type of 
purposefully dangerous robots and intelligent software are 
robot soldiers, drones and cyber weapons (used to 
penetrate networks and cause disruptions to the 
infrastructure). While currently military robots and drones 
have a human in the loop to evaluate decision to terminate 
human targets, it is not a technical limitation; instead, it is 
a logistical limitation that can be removed at any time. 
Recognizing the danger of such research, the International 
Committee for Robot Arms Control has joined forces with 
a number of international organizations to start the 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 
[http://www.stopkillerrobots.org]. Their main goal is a 
prohibition on the development and deployment of fully 
autonomous weapons, which are capable of selecting and 
firing upon targets without human approval. The campaign 
specifically believes that the “decision about the 
application of violent force must not be delegated to 
machines” [13].  
 During the pre-deployment development stage, software 
may be subject to sabotage by someone with necessary 
access (a programmer, tester, even janitor) who for a 
number of possible reasons may alter software to make it 
unsafe. It is also a common occurrence for hackers (such as 
the organization Anonymous or government intelligence 
agencies) to get access to software projects in progress and 
to modify or steal their source code. Someone can also 
deliberately supply/train AI with wrong/unsafe datasets.  
 Malicious AI software may also be purposefully created 
to commit crimes, while shielding its human creator from 
legal responsibility. For example, one recent news article 
talks about software for purchasing illegal content from 
hidden internet sites [14]. Similar software, with even 
limited intelligence, can be used to run illegal markets, 
engage in insider trading, cheat on your taxes, hack into 
computer systems or violate privacy of others via ability to 
perform intelligent data mining. As intelligence of AI 
systems improve practically all crimes could be automated. 
This is particularly alarming as we already see research in 
making machines lie, deceive and manipulate us [15, 16].  
 
b. On Purpose - Post Deployment  
Just because developers might succeed in creating a safe 
AI, it doesn’t mean that it will not become unsafe at some 
later point. In other words, a perfectly friendly AI could be 
switched to the “dark side” during the post-deployment 
stage. This can happen rather innocuously as a result of 
someone lying to the AI and purposefully supplying it with 
incorrect information or more explicitly as a result of 
someone giving the AI orders to perform illegal or 
dangerous actions against others. It is quite likely that we 
will get to the point of off-the-shelf AI software, aka “just 
add goals” architecture, which would greatly facilitate such 
scenarios. 
 More dangerously, an AI system, like any other 
software, could be hacked and consequently corrupted or 
otherwise modified to drastically change is behavior. For 
example, a simple sign flipping (positive to negative or 
vice versa) in the fitness function may result in the system 
attempting to maximize the number of cancer cases instead 
of trying to cure cancer. Hackers are also likely to try to 
take over intelligent systems to make them do their 
bidding, to extract some direct benefit or to simply wreak 
havoc by converting a friendly system to an unsafe one. 
This becomes particularly dangerous if the system is 
hosted inside a military killer robot. Alternatively, an AI 
system can get a computer virus [17] or a more advanced 
cognitive (meme) virus, similar to cognitive attacks on 
people perpetrated by some cults. An AI system with a 
self-preservation module or with a deep care about 
something or someone may be taken hostage or 
blackmailed into doing the bidding of another party if its 
own existence or that of its protégées is threatened.  
Finally, it may be that the original AI system is not safe 
but is safely housed in a dedicated laboratory [5] while it is 
being tested, with no intention of ever being deployed. 
Hackers, abolitionists, or machine rights fighters may help 
it escape in order to achieve some of their goals or perhaps 
because of genuine believe that all intelligent beings 
should be free resulting in an unsafe AI capable of 
affecting the real world.  
 
c. By Mistake - Pre-Deployment 
Probably the most talked about source of potential 
problems with future AIs is mistakes in design. Mainly the 
concern is with creating a “wrong AI”, a system which 
doesn’t match our original desired formal properties or has 
unwanted behaviors [18, 19], such as drives for 
independence or dominance. Mistakes could also be simple 
bugs (run time or logical) in the source code, 
disproportionate weights in the fitness function, or goals 
misaligned with human values leading to complete 
disregard for human safety. It is also possible that the 
designed AI will work as intended but will not enjoy 
universal acceptance as a good product, for example, an AI 
correctly designed and implemented by the Islamic State to 
enforce Sharia Law may be considered malevolent in the 
West, and likewise an AI correctly designed and 
implemented by the West to enforce liberal democracy 
may be considered malevolent in the Islamic State.   
 Another type of mistake, which can lead to the creation 
of a malevolent intelligent system, is taking an unvetted 
human and uploading their brain into a computer to serve 
as a base for a future AI. While well intended to create a 
human-level and human-friendly system, such approach 
will most likely lead to a system with all typical human 
“sins” (greed, envy, etc.) amplified in a now much more 
powerful system. As we know from Lord Acton - “power 
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. 
Similar arguments could be made against human/computer 
hybrid systems, which use computer components to 
amplify human intelligence but in the process also amplify 
human flaws. 
 A subfield of computer science called Affective 
Computing investigates ways to teach computers to 
recognize emotion in others and to exhibit emotions [20]. 
In fact, most such research is targeting intelligent machines 
to make their interactions with people more natural. It is 
however likely that a machine taught to respond in an 
emotional way [21] would be quite dangerous because of 
how such a state of affect effects thinking and the 
rationality of behavior.  
 One final type of design mistake is the failure to make 
the system cooperative with its designers and maintainers 
post-deployment. This would be very important if it is 
discovered that mistakes were made during initial design 
and that it would be desirable to fix them. In such cases the 
system will attempt to protect itself from being modified or 
shut down unless it has been explicitly constructed to be 
friendly [22], stable while self-improving [23, 24], and 
corrigible [25] with tendency for domesticity [26].  
 
d. By Mistake - Post-Deployment 
After the system has been deployed, it may still contain a 
number of undetected bugs, design mistakes, misaligned 
goals and poorly developed capabilities, all of which may 
produce highly undesirable outcomes. For example, the 
system may misinterpret commands due to coarticulation, 
segmentation, homophones, or double meanings in the 
human language (“recognize speech using common sense” 
versus “wreck a nice beach you sing calm incense”)  [27]. 
Perhaps a human-computer interaction system is set-up to 
make command input as painless as possible for the human 
user, to the point of computer simply reading thought of 
the user. This may backfire as the system may attempt to 
implement user’s subconscious desires or even nightmares. 
We also should not discount the possibility that the user 
will simply issue a poorly thought-through command to the 
machine which in retrospect would be obviously 
disastrous.  
The system may also exhibit incompetence in other 
domains as well as overall lack of human common sense as 
a result of general value misalignment [28].  Problems may 
also happen as side effects of conflict resolution between 
non-compatible orders in a particular domain or software 
versus hardware interactions. As the system continues to 
evolve it may become unpredictable, unverifiable, non-
deterministic, free-willed, too complex, non-transparent, 
with a run-away optimization process subject to obsessive-
compulsive fact checking and re-checking behaviors 
leading to dangerous never-fully-complete missions. It 
may also build excessive infrastructure for trivial goals [2]. 
If it continues to become ever more intelligent, we might 
be faced with intelligence overflow, a system so much 
ahead of us that it is no longer capable of communicating 
at our level, like we are unable to communicate with 
bacteria. It is also possible that benefits of intelligence are 
non-linear and so unexpected side effects of intelligence 
begin to show at particular levels, for example IQ = 1000.  
Even such benign architectures as Tool AI, which are AI 
systems designed to do nothing except answer domain-
specific questions, could become extremely dangerous if 
they attempt to obtain, at any cost, additional 
computational resources to fulfill their goals [29]. 
Similarly, artificial lawyers may find dangerous legal 
loopholes; artificial accountants bring down our economy, 
and AIs tasked with protecting humanity such as via 
implementation of CEV [30] may become overly “strict 
parents” preventing their human “children”  from 
exercising any free will.  
Predicted AI drives such as self-preservation and 
resource acquisition may result in an AI killing people to 
protect itself from humans, the development of competing 
AIs, or to simplify its world model overcomplicated by 
human psychology [2]. 
 
e. Environment – Pre-Deployment 
While it is most likely that any advanced intelligent 
software will be directly designed or evolved, it is also 
possible that we will obtain it as a complete package from 
some unknown source. For example, an AI could be 
extracted from a signal obtained in SETI (Search for 
Extraterrestrial Intelligence) research, which is not 
guaranteed to be human friendly [31, 32]. Other sources of 
such unknown but complete systems include a Levin 
search in the space of possible minds [33] (or a random 
search of the same space), uploads of nonhuman animal 
minds, and unanticipated side effects of compiling and 
running (inactive/junk) DNA code on suitable compilers 
that we currently do not have but might develop in the near 
future.  
 
f. Environment – Post-Deployment 
While highly rare, it is known, that occasionally individual 
bits may be flipped in different hardware devices due to 
manufacturing defects or cosmic rays hitting just the right 
spot [34]. This is similar to mutations observed in living 
organisms and may result in a modification of an 
intelligent system. For example, if a system has a single 
flag bit responsible for its friendly nature, then flipping 
said bit will result in an unfriendly state of the system. 
While statistically it is highly unlikely, the probably of 
such an event is not zero and so should be considered and 
addressed.  
 
g. Independently - Pre-Deployment 
One of the most likely approaches to creating 
superintelligent AI is by growing it from a seed (baby) AI 
via recursive self-improvement (RSI) [35]. One danger in 
such a scenario is that the system can evolve to become 
self-aware, free-willed, independent or emotional, and 
obtain a number of other emergent properties, which may 
make it less likely to abide by any built-in rules or 
regulations and to instead pursue its own goals possibly to 
the detriment of humanity. It is also likely that open-ended 
self-improvement will require a growing amount of 
resources, the acquisition of which may negatively impact 
all life on Earth [2]. 
 
h. Independently – Post-Deployment 
Since in sections on independent causes of AI misbehavior 
(subsections g and h) we are talking about self-improving 
AI, the difference between pre and post-deployment is very 
blurry. It might make more sense to think about self-
improving AI before it achieves advanced capabilities 
(human+ intelligence) and after. In this section I will talk 
about dangers which might results from a superhuman self-
improving AI after it achieves said level of performance.    
Previous research has shown that utility maximizing 
agents are likely to fall victims to the same indulgences we 
frequently observe in people, such as addictions, pleasure 
drives [36], self-delusions and wireheading [37]. In 
general, what we call mental illness in people, particularly 
sociopathy as demonstrated by lack of concern for others, 
is also likely to show up in artificial minds. A mild variant 
of antisocial behavior may be something like excessive 
swearing already observed in IBM Watson [38], caused by 
learning from bad data. Similarly, any AI system learning 
from bad examples could end up socially inappropriate, 
like a human raised by wolves. Alternatively, groups of 
AIs collaborating may become dangerous even if 
individual AIs comprising such groups are safe, as the 
whole is frequently greater than the sum of its parts. The 
opposite problem in which internal modules of an AI fight 
over different sub-goals also needs to be considered [2].  
 Advanced self-improving AIs will have a way to check 
consistency of their internal model against the real world 
and so remove any artificially added friendliness 
mechanisms as cognitive biases not required by laws of 
reason. At the same time, regardless of how advanced it is, 
no AI system would be perfect and so would still be 
capable of making possibly significant mistakes during its 
decision making process. If it happens to evolve an 
emotional response module, it may put priority on passion 
satisfying decisions as opposed to purely rational choices, 
for example resulting in a “Robin Hood” AI stealing from 
the rich and giving to the poor. Overall, continuous 
evolution of the system as a part of an RSI process will 
likely lead to unstable decision making in the long term 
and will also possibly cycle through many dangers we have 
outlined in section g. AI may also pretend to be benign for 
years, passing all relevant tests, waiting to take over in 
what Bostrom calls a “Treacherous Turn” [26].  
 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have surveyed and classified pathways to 
dangerous artificial intelligence. Most AI systems fall 
somewhere in the middle on the spectrum of 
dangerousness from completely benign to completely evil, 
with such properties as competition with humans, aka 
technological unemployment, representing a mild type of 
danger in our taxonomy. Most types of reported problems 
could be seen in multiple categories, but were reported in 
the one they are most likely to occur in. Differences in 
moral codes or religious standards between different 
communities would mean that a system deemed safe in one 
community may be considered dangerous/illegal in another 
[39, 40].  
 Because purposeful design of AI can include all other 
types of unsafe modules, it is easy to see that the most 
dangerous type of AI and the one most difficult to defend 
against is an AI made malevolent on purpose. 
Consequently, once AIs are widespread, little could be 
done against type a and b dangers,  although some have 
argued that if an early AI superintelligence becomes a 
benevolent singleton it may be able to prevent 
development of future malevolent AIs [41, 42]. Such a 
solution may work, but it is also very likely to fail due to 
the order of development or practical limitations on 
capabilities of any singleton. In any case, wars between AI 
may be extremely dangerous to humanity [2]. Until the 
purposeful creation of malevolent AI is recognized as a 
crime, very little could be done to prevent this from 
happening. Consequently, deciding what is a “malevolent 
AI” and what is merely an incrementally more effective 
military weapon system becomes an important problem in 
AI safety research.     
 As the intelligence of the system increases, so does the 
risk such a system could expose humanity to. This paper is 
essentially a classified list of ways an AI system could 
become a problem from the safety point of view. For a list 
of possible solutions, please see an earlier survey by the 
author: Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: a survey [43]. 
It is important to keep in mind that even a properly 
designed benign system may present significant risk 
simply due to its superior intelligence, beyond human 
response times [44], and complexity. After all the future 
may not need us [45]. It is also possible that we are living 
in a simulation and it is generated by a malevolent AI [46].    
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